Community Property Laws in Light of the Equal Rights Amendment by Toulouse, Charlotte Mary
Journal of Legislation
Volume 1 | Issue 1 Article 5
1-5-1975
Community Property Laws in Light of the Equal
Rights Amendment
Charlotte Mary Toulouse
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/jleg
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journal of Legislation at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of
Legislation by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Toulouse, Charlotte Mary (1975) "Community Property Laws in Light of the Equal Rights Amendment," Journal of Legislation: Vol. 1:
Iss. 1, Article 5.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/jleg/vol1/iss1/5
COMIUNITY PROPERTY LAWS
IN LIGHT OF THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT
Charlotte Mary Toulouse*
I. Equal Rights
The proposed Equal Rights Amendment:
Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of sex. Con-
gress and the several States shall have the power, within their
respective jurisdictions, to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
Community Property Law, Corpus Juris Secundum:
The husband is the head and master of the community. As such
he has the general management and control of all the property
of the community. His right to management and control does
not depend on delivery of the property to him and the right is
not impaired by possession of the wife. The husband ordinarily
may sell community personal property, and he may do this not
only without her consent or knowledge, but against her objections
when he reasonably believes that the community will benefit.
1
If the Equal Rights Amendment is ratified and becomes part of
the United States Constitution, there is little doubt that the community
property system will have to undergo a change. Although the changes that
are foreseen will be far-reaching, they will not be revolutionary. Already
two states, Washington and Texas, have voluntarily changed their laws, taking
away from the husband his automatic right to be manager of the community.
Until recently community property law accepted as a basic
premise the idea that the husband was manager of the community. The con-
stitutionality of the concept has never been dealt with by the courts.
Challenges attacking community property laws on the grounds that they invaded
a personal right, i.e. equal protection, have been struck down because of the
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long recognized axiom that "a community property law concerns property; it
does not deal with the personal rights or conditions of the spouses."2 The
husband's superior statutory rights to manage and control the community property
arose from the assumption that the community property had been acquired by
the husband and the traditional notion that a man's place is providing
support and a woman's place is in the home raising children and caring for the
husband.3 The legislatures and the courts also felt that the community
property laws served to protect, not violate, the wife's equal protection
rights. The wife was given an equal, present, vested interest and even
thcugh the husband was made the administrator of the community, he did not
thereby acquire a greater interest in the community property.
4
The Supreme Court of the United States ruled in 1930 that the
fact the husband had full control, power, and dominion over the community
property did not negate the wife's present interest and stated, "the husband
is the manager of the affairs of the marital relationship; if the husband
proves an unfit manager, the wife should be allowed to bring about an
immediate dissolution and liquidation of the community property." 5  Thus
the courts as well as the public have always taken for granted that the
husband has an initially unquestionable right to manage the community.
However, recentlypeople have begun to voice the opinion that the
granting of more authority to one spouse than the other actually violates
the basic partnership concept behind community property. 6 The partnership
relationship should be the same as the business partnership. In order that
this may be accomplished, the law must be changed so that the husband and
wife can decide for themselves how they wish to order their relationship.
II. General Changes
With the advent of joint or dual control over community property
many changes will occur. The following changes are ones that are general
in nature and will apply to all the community property states. The list is
composed of powers which have been exclusively enjoyed by the husband. With
joint control the wife will also be given these powers over the community
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property:
1. general power to contract for the community;
2. delegate authority to collect money due the community;
3. enforce and protect community rights;
4. dispose of the income of his or her labor:
5. withdraw community funds;
6. buy or loan personally;
7. refinance an indebtedness;
8. pay taxes due on community property;
9. enter into an agreement fixing the boundary lines between
community property and adjacent land;
10. release obligations owed to the community;
11. remit a portion of a judgment for taking of community
property for a public use;
12. relinquish premises or abandon interests held under a lease;
13. surrender insurance policies for cash surrender value;
14. subordinate a vendor's lien to another lien;
15. surrender vendee's rights to land in return for cancellation
of the purchase money notes.
The main problem arising as a result of the wife being given
the above powers is that people dealing with a married person will have to
make sure that both spouses agree to any transactions. In reality this will
not be as troublesome as it seems. The present law can easily be expanded
so that both husband and wife are acting in a representative capacity as the
agent of the community or the other spouse. This agency can arise either
from express authority or from the conduct of the parties. Thus the parties
can provide by power of attorney or some other agreement in writing who is
the managing partner. Or, a spouse can ratify the action of the other spouse
simply by his or her conduct, and thus be estopped from questioning the
validity of any action or agreement which affects the community. In the
absence of such agreement, ratification or estoppel, the other spouse would
not be bound by unauthorized or fraudulent acts of his or her partner.
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III. Specific State Changes
This section will deal with the current statutes in five states
and will include decisions which control or explain, or which are now
overruled by recent legislation.
California
California Code section 5125: ". . . the husband has the
management and control of the community property, with like
absolute power of disposition, other than testamentary, as
he has of his separate estate. .. ."
California is one of the few states which has talked in terms
of constitutional rights when deciding cases involving community property
laws. An 1897 California Supreme Court decision makes it almost impossible
for the legislature of California to adopt a dual control of community property.
In order to change the present system this decision will have to be overruled
by the court itself or by a constitutional amendment. The court stated that
"to apply legislation decreasing the dominion and control of the husband
over existing community property is to unconstitutionally deprive the husband
of a vested property right." 7
The cases since this time have consistently held that "be de-
creasing the husband's control and thereby simultaneously increasing the
wife's control over the existing community property, constitutes a taking
of property without due process of law."
8
The most recent California case in this area is Addison v. Addison. 9
In this decision the court upheld Spreckels, but did so reluctantly. In the
opinion by Judge Traynor, the court cited all of the reasons why Spreckels
should be overruled, but instead of specifically overruling it they limited
it by saying "existing statutes changing the rights of husband and wife
in community property have no retroactive application but must be limited
to prospective application."
If California law is changed to allow for dual control, a problem
will arise as to payment of debts formally classified as the husbands,
and therefore payable out of community funds. This is illustrated in a
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California decision holding that the husband must pay alimony payments to
his first wife out of the community funds of the second marriage because as
"manager of the community property, 'with like absolute power of disposition,
other than testamentary, as he has of his separate estate,' the husband may
voluntarily discharge such obligations from community property.
" 10
In other words, in California all debts which are not specifically
made the obligation of the wife are grouped together as obligations of
the husband and of the community property. With the advent of joint control,
this will have to change so that all debts (of both husband and wife) are
made the obligation of the community or so that the husband's debts will
have to be treated in the same manner as the wife's debts currently are
(i.e, as separate obligations, not payable out of community property).
New Mexico
N.M.S.A. 957-4-3. "The husband has the management and control
of the personal property of the community, and during
coverture the husband shall have the sole power of disposition
of the personal property of the community, other than testa-
mentary, as he has of his separate estate; . .. .
New Mexico has long defended the concept of the husband as
head of the community. In the leading case in this area the New Mexico
Supreme Court stated, "As head of the community the husband acts in a
representative capacity with respect to the wife's interest in community
property, and that this power is found in the law of the family.""1 (emphasis
added)
The main discrepancy which will be corrected with the adoption
of the Equal Rights Amendment in New Mexico concerns two statutes. One
gives the entire community property to the husband, without administration
upon the wife's death. The other, dealing with the husband's death, gives
the property to the wife, but makes it subject to the husband's power of
testamentary disposition over one half and to all debts, funeral expenses
and administration expenses. 1 2 The result is that the woman is denied the
advantage of equal testamentary power, and the husband gets a tax break.
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Since, upon the death of the wife, the husband is the absolute owner of
the entire community, he does not have to pay any estate tax on the wife's
one-half interest. To remedy this inequality, all that has to be done is
to grant the wife the power of testamentary disposition over one-half of
the community property.
Arizona
125-211(B). "During coverture, personal property may be
disposed of by the husband only."
§25-214. ". . married women do not have the right to make
contracts binding the common property of the husband and
wife."
§25-216. "The community property of the husband and wife
is liable for the community debts contracted by the husband
during the marriage unless specially excepted by law."
Without the enactment of the Equal Rights Amendment, there is
little hope that an Arizona court will rule that the husband's right to
manage the community is unconstitutional. In the most recent decision in
this area the court noted that "In Arizona, the husband is recognized as
the head of the family and its agent in control, and management of the
community estate."13 Thus, to correct the inequities of the above quoted
statutes the Equal Rights Amendment must be ratified or the legislature must
change the laws.
Washington
The 1972 Washington state legislature changed the laws of
its state to provide for joint or dual control. Chapter 108 -
Washington Laws, 1972 1st Ex. Sess. "Either spouse, acting
alone, may manage and control community property, with a like
power of disposition as the acting spouse has over his or her
separate property. .. ."
The above modification of the law of Washington probably will
change the results reached in National Bank of Commerce of Seattle v.
Green. 14  Here the court upheld the idea that a note executed or endorsed
by the husband for the benefit of the community is a community obligation,
while a wife's note constitutes her separate obligation. This reasoning
was justified because "the husband as manager of the community personal
property is empowered to subject the community debts by his sole act or
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signature."
Texas
F.C. §5.22. "During marriage, each spouse has the sole management,
control, and disposition of the community property that he or
she would have owned if single."
F.C. R5.22(c). "The community property is subject to the joint
management, control, and disposition of the husband and wife,
unless the spouses provide otherwise by power of attorney of
other agreement in writing."
F.C. 95.24(b). "A third person dealing with a spouse is
entitled to rely (as against the other spouse or anyone claiming
from that spouse) on that spouse's authority to deal with
the property. .. ."
The Texas law, while allowing for dual control as in Washington,
is clearer and better defined than that of Washington. The Texas law
specifically allows the husband to continue as head of the community, if
the parties so stipulate, and it protects a third person dealing with only
one of the members of the community. These are matters which are not provided
for by Washington. The T.oxas law seems to be a good one, for it has taken
into account the changing status of women and the family in America and it
has tried to reflect these changes in a fair and equitable statute. Thus,
the Texas statute would serve as a good model for states to follow in the
future.
One interesting result of the Texas statute is that it has
the effect of changing federal jurisdictional amount qualification. Before
passage of the present law, Texas had allowed only the husband to bring
a suit for damage to community property because as head and master of the
community he was its only legal representative. Thus, in a 1962 case the
Court of Appeals held that "damage to an automobile which was owned by
the community, and the wife's lost wages, which belonged to the community,
could not be combined with the wife's personal injury claim (which
constituted her separate property) in order to reach the jurisdictional
amount." 15
Community property laws for years have been rigid and unchanging.
The principles find their root in Spain and were spread to the New World
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during the conquests of the sixteenth century. It has only been in the
last few years that the concept has undergone some re-defining, that, in
order for marriage partners to be equals, both have been allowed control
of the community property. I hope that when Corpus Juris Secundum puts
out a replacement for its Volume 41 that it can no longer unequivocally
and without noting any exceptions write:
"The wife has no power or control or management of community
property; she cannot sell or mortgage it, or give it away,
or contract community debts."
16
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